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This research investigates whether an equity improvement within retirement-systems domain 
may  positively  influence  demography,  people’s  happiness  and  their  financial  conditions.  In 
particular, a fertility-boosting policy has been tested, acting on the contributory rate. 
This project has been carried out by using software simulation and with specific Agent-based 
Computational Economics (ACE) methodology. Two virtual worlds have been created, in order to 
try to reproduce Italian society. In the first model, (W1), vertical equity has been improved, while in 
the second one, (W2), it is has not. Five further variants of these two worlds have been produced by 
altering some parameters, in order to test our hypothesis through several simulations. 
The research outcomes prove that an equity improvement can positively influence demographic 
trends, can  increase the  level  of  happiness  in  the  society, and  can  grant  a  more  homogeneous 
welfare redistribution. 
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1.  Introduction 
Nowadays,  in  European  countries,  retirement  systems  are  burdened  by  a  serious  crisis.  In 
particular, the ageing of society, the decline of fertility, and the expected growth of the dependency 
ratio
‡, suggest that the financial sustainability of pay-as-you-go systems requires close attention. 
Thus, to suitably face these problems, in the vast majority of modern countries, retirement systems 
have adopted policies to strengthen the link between contributions paid and benefits received. and 
have tried to provide incentives to work longer (Commission of the European Communities 2006).  
Many European governments place great emphasis on the contribution which privately- funded 
provision  can  make  in  ensuring  adequate  retirement  incomes,  emphasising  the  positive  role  of 
diversification  of  the  demographic  risk  between  public  and  private  schemes.  However,  funded 
systems will also be affected by population ageing. Furthermore, the effectiveness of these systems 
strongly depends on the existence of profitable markets, where contributions paid by workers and 
money saved in private retirement plans may be invested in. When economies are in crisis, like in 
these  years,  there  are  not  so  many  good  investment  opportunities  and  the  long-term  financial 
sustainability of the aforesaid models is critical. 
The crisis perceived in the economies of several countries of EU-25, is also due to demographic 
trends. Indeed, the decline of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and the ageing of society are causing 
the  decline  of  both  the  productive  power  and  consumptions.  In  a  recent  survey,  the  European 
Commission claims that in EU-15, the annual labour productivity growth decreased from 2.3 in 
1990-95 to 1.7 in 1995-2001 (European Commission 2003). 
Immigration could help governments in solving these problems, but that requires investment in a 
lot of resources. Thus, policies to boost fertility are needed to improve financial sustainability of the 
retirement systems and to encourage the economic growth. 
 
A fundamental principle of modern tax-sharing systems concerns equal contributory power, and 
it asserts that the taxes required to finance public expenditure must be proportional to people’s 
contributory power. This assumption is based on two equity criteria. The first regards vertical equity 
and claims that individuals who have high contributory power should pay more taxes than those 
with low contributory power. The second is related to horizontal equity, and states that the amount 
of taxes to be paid should be the same if people have equal contributory power.  
The contributory power represents one’s ability to produce wealth. Unfortunately, this kind of 
ability is not measurable, so governments consider income and consumption to compute it.  
This project concerns retirement systems domain and investigates, through software simulation, 
policies aiming at improving horizontal equity. The equity goal, indeed, may be reached not only 
within the tax system, but also in other domains. Our aim is to  understand if demographic trends, 
happiness and people’s financial conditions may be positively influenced by retirement systems’ 
policies designed to grant a higher level of equity.  
2.  Hypothesis and Methodology Adopted 
Retirement  systems  originally  implemented  after  the  Second  World  War,  were  based  on  an 
intergenerational agreement which establishes that workers’ Social Security contributions must be 
immediately used to pay the retirement benefits of the elderly. Acting in this way, no stocks are 
created, and one’s Social Security contributions are not used for one’s pension. They only grant  
workers the right to receive retirement benefits in their old age.  
Pay-as-you-go systems are funded on the basis of this agreement, and can work properly  only if 
there are many more workers than pensioners, as was the situation some decades ago. Nowadays,  
the situation has greatly changed. The substantial growth of life expectancy and the fact that TFR is 
much  lower than that needed to grant population replacement
§, are causing the ageing of society. In 
                                                
‡ Population aged 65 or more related to number of people employed. 
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particular, between 2004 and 2050 in EU-25, life expectancy is thought to increase by 7 years for 
men (from 73,7 years to 80,5 years) and by 5 years for women (from 80,4 years to 85,6 years). 
TFR, instead, is expected to remain very close to the current value of 1.5 (Commission of the 
European Communities 2006).  
Furthermore, over the next decade, the working-age population will begin to decline when a 
large  number  of  baby-boomers  retire.  Consequently,  according  to  the  latest  demographic 
projections, between now and 2050 the economic dependency ratio is expected to grow from 37 to 
70. This would mean that, while there are currently almost 3 workers for each pensioner, in 2050 
there would be only 1.4 workers per pensioner (European Commission 2006). Thus, the level of 
contributions will diminish, while the years in receipt of benefits will increase.  
In order to deal with demographic developments, pension reforms have strengthened the link 
between contributions paid and benefits received. However, this may not be sufficient. Both the 
pay-as-you-go systems and the contributory ones require positive economic trends in order to work 
properly, while demography nowadays is negatively influencing productivity and consumption.  
Within this context, children are a very precious resource for society and, obviously, families 
that are numerous participate more intensely in the intergenerational agreement than those without 
children. Moreover, having children implies expenditures which negatively affect families’ income. 
Hence, for the same level of gross income, a family with children has a lower contributory power 
than a family without children. In light of these considerations, if vertical equity were granted, then 
Social  Security  contributions  would  be  lower  for  numerous  families,  which  is  not  the  case  in 
Europe. 
The goal here is to experimentally study the consequences of an equity improvement of the 
contributory system on demography, happiness and families’ income. In particular, we investigate if 
such improvement can positively modify the demographic trends emerging from several official 
reports (Commission of European Communities 2006, European Commission 2006).  
The economic sphere has generally seemed to be ineffective in influencing demographic trends. 
However,  according  to  De  Santis  and  Breschi  (2003),  this  conclusion  is  not  necessarily  true. 
Fertility can be positively affected by economic stimuli even though the causes of its decline are 
different. 
 
Simulation and, in particular, the ACE technique, is the analytical approach here used. ACE may 
be  useful  because  one  of  its  main  objectives  is  normative  understanding  (Tesfatsion  2005).  In 
particular,  ACE  allows  the  computational  study  of  economies  modelled  as  evolving  systems 
consisting of heterogeneous agents. The ACE designer specifies the initial state of the economy and 
the  agents’  attributes. The economy then evolves over time without further intervention  of the 
engineer, who has only to evaluate the output produced. Furthermore, once the model has been 
built, it is possible to test several hypotheses and different landscapes by changing parameters or 
agents’ attributes. 
  
The research has been carried out through the following steps. At the beginning, two virtual 
realities have been developed in the attempt to reproduce the Italian retirement system. To change 
the  geographical context, it is sufficient to update a set of parameters. 
The  two  models  have  exactly  the  same  features,  except  for  the  management  of  retirement 
contributions. In W1, contributions diminish as the number of children living in a family increases, 
while in W2 the contributory rate is the same for everybody and corresponds to 35% of the gross 
income. 
Subsequently, five  alternative  hypotheses  have been considered  by  changing  the  importance 
given to children within a society and the average costs that a family has to face for each child. 
These alternatives have been implemented by tuning the proper parameters in W1 and in W2.  
Finally, simulations have been carried out and the output data have been collected and analysed. 
Through a descriptive analysis, what may be inferred about demography, happiness and wealth                                                                         4 
distribution has been investigated by observing the output data. Then, a more critical inquiry has 
been  developed  using  linear  regressions,  to  understand  the  role  of  income  and  children  in 
determining families’ happiness. 
3.  The model: structure 
The retirement system models needed for simulations have been implemented using SWARM, 
an object-oriented language widely adopted by ACE researchers. 
Here W1 is described. With the exception of the aforesaid difference, W2 has the same software 
design and structure as W1. 
 
The virtual world developed is an extremely simplified version of reality. To grant order and 
modularity, it has been conceived by following a scheme suggested in the literature (Terna 2006). 
This model reproduces the Italian population’s characteristics, laws and demographic trends. 
 
To  transform  the  ideas  of  agent-based  simulations  into  executable  code,  the  literature  has 
provided  several schemes, from which  we have chosen the one of Terna  (2006) to  define  our 
retirement system model. 
Terna’s  proposal  is  called  Enviromental-Rules-Agents  (ERA)  scheme,  and  is  represented  in 
Figure 3.1. What Terna has done is to manage the development of the model and of its agents 
through four distinct layers.  
The  first  level  is  the  environment  where  agents  interact,  and  it  corresponds  to  the  class 
ModelSwarm within SWARM protocol. In this context, agents are defined, lists are structured, 
events are scheduled and rules of interaction are clarified with respect to the methods of the objects 
created in the model. The second layer is dedicated to agents, while the third one specifies the ways 
through which agents decide their behaviour. For every decision, actors have to query the Rule 
Master, communicating to it the necessary data and obtaining the desired information. Finally, in 
the  fourth  layer,  rules  are  created  by  generators  placed  in  classes  usually  called  Rule  Maker. 





Figure 3.1 ERA Scheme (Terna et al. 2006, pag.27) 
 
The ERA Scheme aims at making the simulation code clear, simple and modular. 
 
The implemented model is somewhat similar to the one proposed by Terna, and is organised as 
shown in Figure 3.2. The first level is called Observer Swarm and is used to show the output of the                                                                         5 
model. The second layer, called Model Swarm, is the environment of virtual reality, while the third 
one is composed of all the different classes of agents.  
The model which we have developed is a simplified ERA version. We decided to eliminate the 
Rule Master and the Rule Maker because, in our model, agents operate without invoking other 
agents to mediate decision processes. The Rule Maker may be considered as a heuristic function 
which manages agents’ decision-making processes. The Rule Master instead, can be seen as a set of 
heuristic functions which are activated to let agents carry out their tasks. If there is no proper 
heuristic function  to solve an agent’s behavioural problem, it will be created by the Rule Maker. 
These kinds of features have not been implemented in our model because our agents have a limited 
set of alternative behaviours and they have few alternative choices. 
In the following sections the structure of each layer of our model will be described in detail. 
 
 
Figure 3.2  Retirement System Schema 
3.1 Observer Swarm 
Observer Swarm manages the graphic interface and the output visualization. 
When the software is launched, a panel (Figure A1.1) allows the user to set the initial values of 
the variables. If no setting is specified, the default values will be used. In this phase, two further 
masks  appear  on  the  screen.  The  first  mask  (Figure  A1.2)  is  used  to  set  the  frequency  of 
visualization of the data trends, while the second (Figure A1.3) allows one to control the execution 
of the programme.  
Furthermore, several windows appear on the screen to show the trends of the numerousness of 
agents (Figure A1.6), and of the average income (Figure A1.4) and happiness (Figure A1.5) of 
families with children and of the ones without children. Besides the trend visualization, some bar 
charts (Figure A1.7-9) show the values of the variables of interest in each run of the execution.  
3.2 Model Swarm 
Model Swarm represents the environment where agents live and interact. The most important 
parameters of the model, such as: 
- The numerousness of actors in the virtual world; 
- Income of families and of pensioners; 
- Duration of working life required to receive retirement pension; 
- Age at which youths start looking for a partner and for a job; 
- Expenditures due to children. It should be taken into account that this kind of costs are not     
subject to economies of scale, so every baby will require the same amount of income (Perali 2005); 
- Taxes; 
- Contributory rate; 
may be exogenously set to properly describe the context analyzed. To simplify the model, absence 
of inflation has been assumed.                                                                         6 
After the initial phase, Model Swarm carries out the same sequence of steps at every run of the 
application. Each step will now be described, following the order established in the software. 
 
Initially, using the function endPens, the system checks if there are pensioners who will die in 
the current run. ISTAT data (represented in Table 3.1) have been used to calculate the probability of 
death related to each agent. 
 
Age  Deads  Total  Death Rate  Probability of 
Death 
0-0  2182  527468  413,674  0,41% 
1-4  402  2103859  19,108  0,019% 
5-9  327  2664493  12,279  0,012% 
10-14  379  2882686  13,38  0,013% 
15-19  1092  2921135  37,383  0,037% 
20-24  1724  3344108  51,553  0,051% 
25-29  2292  4171717  54,941  0,054% 
30-34  2817  4546683  61,957  0,061% 
35-39  3908  4681288  83,481  0,08% 
40-44  5298  4160032  127,355  0,1273% 
45-49  7529  3779228  199,221  0,1992% 
50-54  12070  3795411  318,016  0,3180% 
55-59  17745  3408656  520,586  0,5205% 
60-64  27998  3442709  813,255  0,8132% 
65-69  41288  3091842  1335,385  1,335% 
70-74  63081  2816955  2239,332  2,23% 
75-79  88521  2297421  3853,06  3,853% 
80-84  87993  1355136  6493,297  6,49% 
>85  189021  1216575  15537,137  15,53% 
Table 3.1 Italian death rate in 2002 
In order to explain more clearly the way the death of pensioners has been dealt with, a simple 
example is  proposed here: 
 Let X be a seventy-two-year-old agent. The software links X to her death probability p, which 
corresponds to 2,23%, and randomly draws a number r from a uniform distribution in the range 
[0,100]. Then, the system subtracts 2,23 from 100. If r is smaller than 98, X will survive, otherwise 
she will die. This process reproduces in the model what is claimed by ISTAT data and, indeed, the 
death probability of X is 2%. 
The same process is applied to the other age ranges, excepting the lower one, which groups 
people aged 65-69  years. It has been assumed  that people do  not die before retirement. Thus, 
premature deaths are managed by increasing the chance of dying between 65 and 69 years of age. 
 
After having managed the pensioners’ dying, Model Swarm handles new births invoking  the 
function creaFigli. 
According to recent ISTAT estimates (ISTAT 2005), shown in Table 3.2, in Italy there are 1,33 
children for every woman and the fertility boundary is generally fixed between 15 and 49 years. 
The Italian birth rate is very low because of the progressive drop in births during the last century. 
After a short period of upswing, during the baby boom in the early Sixties, there was a long phase 
of decline of fertility, which reached its minimum point in 1995 with 1,19 children per woman. 
However, starting from the Nineties, there has been a slight increase in the fertility rate. 
This decline is also related to significant changes in the temporal modalities chosen by couples to 
procreate. Nowadays, women tend to delay the birth of their first-born until they are thirty years                                                                         7 
old. Furthermore, demographic trends have greatly transformed the average composition of Italian 
families and the predominant model seems to be the  only child one. Indeed, the fertility crisis  does 
not seem to have an impact on the first-born’s birth because Italian women show that they are 
greatly prone to becoming mothers, even though they desire only one child. 
Keeping these phenomena in consideration and aiming at developing a model as close to reality 
as possible, ISTAT (2001) data have been used to establish the probability of procreating associated 
to an object Fam1.  
 
      CHILDREN       
COUPLES 







33,89%  -- 
1  4.216.9
46 
30,05%  100% 
2  3.912.5
26 
27,88%  54,51% 
3  959.50
9 
6,83%  12,23% 
4  147.44
2 
1,05%  0,18% 
5  27.518  0,19%  0,028% 
6 or more  10.001  0,0007%  0,0001061% 
       
Table 3.2 Data from Italian census of 2001 (ISTAT 2001) 
Moreover, it has been checked when the Italians generally decide to procreate and it has been 
discovered  that  women’s  education  and  job  have  a  strong  impact  on  reproductive  choices.  Of 










Until 25  14,3%  35,1%  18,0%  36,5% 
Until 30  51,8%  72,5%  58,6%  69,8% 
Until 35  87,3%  92,5%  88,6%  92,0% 
Table 3.3 Percentage of first-born births summed up until the age of 25, 30 and 35 and 
grouped by mothers’ job and education level in 2005 (ISTAT 2005, p. 6) 
Following the trends shown, the aforesaid fertility boundary has been reproduced in the model, 
and objects Fam1 wait to be almost thirty years of age before  having a child.  
Once the proper age has been reached, a random number r is drawn from a uniform distribution 
in the range [0,1]. If the probability p of having a child, taken from Table 3.2, is greater than r, there 
will be a new birth, otherwise there will not. 
As far as families which do not want children (Fam2) are concerned, it has been hypothesized 
that a new birth could occur only by accident and not as a consequence of a rational decision. Thus, 
Fam2 may unintentionally procreate at every age within the fertility boundary. The birth process 
remains the same, excepting p, which in this case is 0.1%. 
 
After handling the new births, taxes and Social Security Contributions are calculated.  
Families have to pay a tax, which ideally represents how much every single person costs to 
society. The calculus of Social Security contributions, instead, is a very important point of focus                                                                         8 
here.  Our  study  tries  to  investigate  if  an  equity  improvement  may  positively  influence  the 
demographic trends of a country, paying particular attention to birth rate, salary and happiness.  To 
test this hypothesis, it has been tried to act on Social Security contributions.  
Nowadays, Social Security contributions are not related to the number of children living in a 
family,  and  this  research  inquires  into  the  possibility  to  establish  different  contributory  levels 
depending on the numerousness of children in a family.  
In order to continue working properly, retirement systems require a high birth rate, but a good 
TFR is also needed to boost productivity and consumptions, and to stimulate the economic growth. 
Thus, children are both a precious resource for society and a relevant expenditure for families. The 
families which have children contribute more to the intergenerational agreement than those who do 
not, and they benefit from a smaller contributory power because children have a negative impact on 
their salaries. Hence, a contributory relief for families with children may improve vertical equity.  
In light of these considerations, the management of contributions within this system rewards 
families  with  children  and  penalizes  the  ones  without  children.  In  particular,  there  is  a  base 
contributory  rate  of    35%,  a  percentage  which will  be  increased  or  reduced  depending  on  the 
number of children living in a family, acting as specified in the following table:  
 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN  SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS 
No children  wage*((contributoryRate + 12) * 0.01) 
1 child  wage*((contributoryRate – 13) * 0.01) 
2 children  wage*((contributoryRate – 14) * 0.01) 
3 children  wage*((contributoryRate – 15) * 0.01) 
4 children  wage*((contributoryRate – 16) * 0.01) 
5 children  wage*((contributoryRate – 17) * 0.01) 
More than 6 children  wage*((contributoryRate – 18) * 0.01) 
Table 3.4 Social Security contributions which a family has to pay depending on the number of 
children. 
The contributory rate has been calculated, as shown in Table 3.4, through a process of fine 
tuning. Proceeding by trial and error, we have established the proper Social Security Contributions 
rate to get from  families without sons exactly the wealth which they would have saved avoiding to 
procreate (20% net income, Perali 2005).  
Contributions are collected in a pension fund which is used to pay current pensions and to save 
extra contributory  yield for the future.  If the gathered  wealth is not sufficient for  granting the 
current  pensions,  taxes  will  be  increased  to  cover  the  deficit  and  to  comply  with  the 
intergenerational agreement. It is clear that in this kind of economic system, the demographic risk in 
toto lies on current workers, who, if necessary, will have to pay more taxes to grant the pensions of 
the elderly. 
The retirement benefit corresponds to 60% of workers’ salary, which in this simplified reality is 
supposed to remain constant during the whole life-cycle.  
 
Then, the age of every agent, the new net salary, the families’ happiness level and the graphs are 
updated.  
 
The software carries on managing the birth of new families. The main task of this function is to 
identify when children become independent and start working.                                                                         9 
Similarly to what emerges from ISTAT (2001) statistics, in the software, agents try to start 
working when they are 23 years of age. Nevertheless, they may have to wait a short time before 
finding a job, because also frictional unemployment has been implemented in the model. 
At the same age, they look for a partner, even though they will wait until they are 30 years of age 
to marry and have children. When two agents decide to get married, they will have to choose 
whether to create a Fam1 or a Fam2. This choice will be influenced both by one’s preferences and 
by the level of happiness reached by families with children and by the ones without children. For 
example, if families with children are happier, it will be more likely that the new family will have 
children too. In fact, in the software, as well as in reality, agents’ choices are affected by what 
happens in the world in which they live. 
 
The software then proceeds to check who is going to become a pensioner. To simplify the model, 
both members of a family retire at the same time.  
Agents have to work for 40 years before retirement. When a family retires, it communicates to 
all its children that  it will  not financially support them any more and  two new pensioners are 
created. 
 
After these steps, Model Swarm saves all the modifications produced. 
3.3 Agents 
As mentioned above, the software consists of four types of agents, which will now be described 
in detail. 
 
The first class of agents analysed is the one which gathers together families without children. 
This kind of family represents couples of agents who do not want to have children. 
Every family without children is an object of the class Fam2 and its attributes are: 
- The age, used to calculate the years of contributions and to establish when it is possible to 
have a child;  
- The  net  salary  obtained  by  subtracting  from  the  gross  income  taxes,  social  security 
contributions and costs related to children; 
- The level of happiness. 
As far as the level of happiness is concerned, there are several ways of measuring Self Well 
Being (SWB).  
Economists typically adopt the view that happiness depends on actual life circumstances and that 
it can be inferred by simply observing such circumstances. At most, this view measures peoples’ 
SWB by calculating their wealth and by believing that if people have more goods they must be 
better off. Clearly, economists recognise that SWB is influenced also by other circumstances apart 
from the mere amount of money, but they assume that a substantial increase in wealth implies an 
increase of SWB as well. 
Over the past thirty years, there has been a gradual accumulation of evidence which contradicts 
this view, like the Chinese trend of SWB measured between 1994 and 2005. Even though Chinese 
salaries have increased by 250%, people seem to be less and less happy (Kahneman and Krueger 
2006). 
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Figure 3.3 Life satisfaction in China (Kahneman and Krueger 2006, p. 16) 
In general, as has emerged from several surveys, limited agreement has been reached concerning 
the way happiness varies during the human life-cycle. However, Kahneman and Easterlin’s views 
have been chosen and merged within this model since they are quite similar, because they consider 
both economic and psychological aspects, and because they develop some interesting ideas which 
are widely accepted within certain domains. 
Kahneman and Krueger (2006) claim that the impact which life circumstances have on SWB, is 
mitigated by psychological processes through which people level off peaks and dips due to peculiar 
events. This model, known as the set-point model, has been widely accepted by researchers and 
supports the hypothesis that happiness tends to stabilize at a level related to personality and genetic 
inheritance. Life circumstances, like a wedding or a disease, can only temporarily change the SWB 
level,  which  will  soon  return  very  close  to  the  original  value.  Kahneman  and  Krueger  (2006) 
mention, as examples, lottery winners or paraplegics, whose happiness, after a great change, returns 
quite close to the original level within two years after the occurrence of the circumstance which has 
changed their life.  
Such transitoriness is called hedonic treadmill and has been justified by conceiving the hedonic 
treadmill  as  an  aspiration  treadmill.  According  to  this  idea,  people  dynamically  adjust  their 
aspirations, depending on the utility level which they reach everyday. Hence, an increase of utility 
may not imply a higher level of satisfaction (Kahneman and Krueger 2006). 
Furthermore, Easterlin (2006) points out that happiness level is strongly related to agents’ age. 
Indeed, according to him, SWB increases until it reaches its peak when people are middle-aged, and 
then it starts to decrease
**. 
In our model, the happiness function operates in agreement with these theories and, in particular, 
according to a research carried out by Easterlin (2006) that we used to define SWB. Happiness is 
conceived as the result of the aggregation of  life satisfaction, perceived within some domains of 
interest, and the outcome is thought to represent the level of matching between reality and goals. 
The advantages related to this approach are twofold.  
Firstly, this theory considers both the subjective factors, related to the psychological field, and 
the objective ones concerning the actual life circumstances, related to the economic point of view. 
In the software, it has been supposed that the software engineer has a complete knowledge of 
agents’ goals, and that their satisfaction depends both on reaching such goals and on an uncertain 
component representing subjective aspirations and the  unpredictability of life.  
Secondly, classifying events in different domains has simplified Easterlin’s interviews, because 
people naturally associated life circumstances, which altered their SWB, with each domain, making 
                                                
** There are authors who do not agree with this view and who claim that the young and the old are 
on average happier than the middle-aged (Agryle 1999), while others point out that SWB constantly 
increases, or at least does not decrease, as time goes by (Diener et al. 1999).                                                                         11 
the  calculation  of  happiness  easier  and  more  precise.  Even  though  this  research  does  not  use 
interviews, the domain method allows one to distinguish happiness trends related to the fields of 
interest, and to get a more precise aggregate result. 
There is no universal agreement about the scopes which should be taken into account when 
defining SWB, but the vast majority of the surveys
†† carried out within this field considers the 
following: 




The implemented software respects this vision and states five variables to calculate happiness,  
each of which is associated with one of the specified domains: 
- alfa concerning the SWB related to financial situation; 
- beta representing happiness coming from family life; 
- gamma measuring the SWB due to the birth of a child (subset of family domain); 
- delta concerning health; 
- epsilon representing job satisfaction. 
These variables are computed at every run of the software and for every family in the model. 
Their values are obtained by drawing a random number from a normal distribution with variance 
0.25. A right, or left, shift of the mean will imply a greater or smaller chance of being happy. 
As far as the calculation of alfa is concerned, the following considerations have been taken 
into account. A research by Kahneman (Kahneman et al. 2006) claims that a rise in salary does not 
necessarily imply a higher happiness level, because relative income seems to be far more important 
than the wage itself. Indeed, people seem to be greatly interested in earning more than their peers. 
Furthermore, individuals adapt very quickly to material goods; thus, wage increases, which are 
expected to raise SWB by raising consumption, may actually have little-lasting effect because of 
hedonic adaptation, and because the consumption of material goods has little effect above certain 
levels.  
Moreover, people’s aspirations change depending on their possibilities, so the more they earn, 
the more they desire to earn. As income increases, people’s time usage does not seem to shift 
towards  activities  associated  with  improved  affection.  In  fact,  the  activities  that  higher-income 
individuals  spend  more  time  engaged  in,  are  generally  associated  with  little  happiness  and  a 
considerable amount of stress and tension (Kahneman et al. 2006). 
Finally, Easterlin (2006) points out that financial satisfaction does not follow the salary trend and 
is significantly influenced   by age. As a  matter  of  fact,  while  wage increases until  people are 
middle-aged  and  then  declines,  financial  satisfaction  moves  almost  inversely,  starting  to  rise 
noticeably in midlife and increasing further in late life, when income  typically declines, as shown 
in Figure 3.13. 
                                                
†† Some examples of empirical studies which have used the life domain approach and which agree in considering 
the domains specified in this paper are the study by Salvatore and Muñon Sastre (2001), the one written by Saris et 
al.(1995), the research conducted by Van Praag e Ferrer-I-Carbonell (2004), and the one carried out by Van Praag, 
Frijters and Ferrer-I-Carbonell (2003).                                                                         12 
 
Figure 3.4 Financial Satisfaction Trend (Easterlin 2006, p.474) 
The trend shows how a model based only on objective circumstances does not correspond to 
reality. A possible explanation for the phenomenon  (Easterlin  2006) is related to  the  aforesaid 
aspiration treadmill. Indeed, early in adult life, material aspirations may rise faster than income, 
and households incur a growing burden of debt which creates financial worries. These emotional 
strains reduce the rise of financial satisfaction due to income growth. Then, late in life, aspirations 
level off and finally decline, and the pressure of debt payments on income declines. As financial 
worries decrease,  financial satisfaction increases.  
There are two key variables which should be considered when calculating alfa: peers’ average 
salary and age. 
At first, agents’ age is checked and the mean of the normal distribution is set as specified in 
Table 3.5, increasing the chance of being happy as time goes by. 
WEALTH 
AGE  MEAN 
< 26  2.06 
26<age<46  2 
46<age<58  2.05 
> 58  2.1 
Table 3.5 Value of the mean of the normal distribution depending on agent’s age. 
Then, applying  Kahneman’s idea concerning the importance of relative wage, the income is 
compared with the average salary of one’s peers, and if the family’s wage is higher than the average 
one, 0.1 will be added to the mean, otherwise the mean will be decreased by 0.1. 
Finally, to get the value of alfa, a random number will be drawn from a normal distribution 
with variance of 0.25 and the mean calculated as specified above. 
As far as family-life satisfaction is concerned, the trend that emerged in Easterlin’s research 
(2006)  has been reproduced in the model. According to the considered point of view, as families 
are built, satisfaction with family life rises, while in midlife and beyond, it tends to decline because 
children leave home, or events like widowhood occur, following the trend shown in Figure 3.14. 
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Figure 3.5 Family Life Satisfaction Trend (Easterlin 2006, p.474) 
Agents’ age is checked and the mean of the normal distribution is set as specified in Table 3.6. 
 
FAMILY LIFE 
AGE  MEAN 
< 26  5.88 
26<age<46  5.97 
46<age<58  6 
> 58  5.97 
Table 3.6 Value of the mean of the normal distribution depending on agent’s age. 
Finally, to obtain the value of beta, a random number is drawn from a normal distribution with 
variance 0.25 and the mean calculated as specified. 
As far as the trend of gamma is concerned, it captures the SWB related to the birth of a new 
child. This kind of event has not been specifically considered by Easterlin, who has studied only 
family life in general, but it has been integrated here because it is of particular interest within this 
study.  
As claimed by Kahneman and Krueger (2006), life circumstances, like the birth of a new child, 
cause a deep change in the trend of happiness in the two years following the event, and we would 
like  to reproduce here such a phenomenon. 
The value of the variable gamma is 0 if a family has no children. When a family has a child, 
hedonic treadmill and goals are taken into account. Fam2 objects do not desire babies, so it is likely 
that their happiness will collapse if a birth occurs. However, according to the set-point model, after 
two years, happiness will level off very closely to the initial value. Given these considerations, the 
mean of the normal distribution from which gamma is drawn is calculated in this way:  
- if there are no children in a family, both the mean and gamma are equal to 0; 
- in the year of a baby’s birth, 0,4 is subtracted from the mean; 
- in the following year, the mean is increased by 0,05; 
- after two years, 0,05 is added; 
- then no further action on the mean is planned until another birth occurs. 
Finally, to get the value of gamma, a random number is drawn from a normal distribution with 
variance 0.25 and the mean is calculated as specified.  
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Figure 3.6 Health Satisfaction Trend (Easterlin 2006, p.474) 
 
As far as the parameter delta is concerned, the trend (Figure 3.15) of SWB emerging from 
Easterlin’s study shows that health satisfaction tends to decrease during the life cycle. Thus, the 
mean of the normal distribution from which delta is drawn is manipulated as described in Table 
3.7. 
HEALTH 
AGE  MEAN 
< 26  5,9 
26<age<46  5,65 
46<age<58  5,4 
> 58  5,3 
Table 3.7 Value of the mean of the normal distribution depending on agent’s age. 
The value of delta is obtained by drawing a random number from a normal distribution with 
variance 0.25 and the mean calculated as specified. 
Finally,  the  parameter  epsilon  is  computed.  Besides  following  the  trend  suggested  by 
Eastelin’s research, in the model, epsilon is related to a random component which represents 
subjective abilities and luck, which can imply a better or a worse job career.  
 
Figure 3.7 Family Life Satisfaction Trend (Easterlin 2006, p.474) 
If an agent has a brilliant career, Easterlin’s trend is shifted upward and the mean of the normal 
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BRILLIANT CAREER 
AGE  MEAN 
< 26  3.2 
26< age <46  3.35 
46< age <58  3.75 
> 58  4.1 
Table 3.8 Value of the mean of the normal distribution depending on agent’s age. 
If not, the mean will respect what is specified in Table 3.9. 
 
NO BRILLIANT CAREER 
AGE  MEAN 
< 26  3.1 
26< age <46  3.25 
46< age <58  3.65 
> 58  3.9 
Table 3.9 Value of the mean of the normal distribution depending on agent’s age. 
The value of epsilon is obtained by drawing a random number from a normal distribution 
with variance 0.25, and the mean is calculated as described before. 
The  happiness  value  is  the  result  of  the  addition  of  alfa,  beta,  gamma,  delta  and 
epsilon. 
 
The second class of agents analysed is the one which groups together families with children. 
Families with children are elements of the class Fam1. Their structure is the same as that of Fam2, 
with the exception of  the calculation of the value of gamma. In particular, when an object of the 
class Fam1 has a child, the software operates on the mean of the normal distribution used to draw 
gamma in this way: 
- if there are no children in a family, both the mean and gamma are equal to 0; 
- in the year of a baby’s birth, 0,4 is added to the mean; 
- in the following year, the mean is decreased by 0,05; 
- two years after the birth, the mean is decreased by 0,05; 
- no further action on the mean is planned until another birth occurs. 
 
The class Figli, instead, collects in a list all the children of the families in the model. An 
identity field links every child to its parents. When a member of Figli class builds a new family, 
s/he is deleted from the children’s list and a new family is created. 
 
Eventually, when the age of retirement is reached, the object Fam1 or Fam2 is deleted and two 
new pensioners are created. The class Pens collects together all pensioners. Every object belonging 
to this class has a field indicating its age to statistically calculate the time of death. 
4.  Simulations 
After having implemented the software, simulations were carried out to investigate what the 
model allows one to infer.                                                                          16 
  
For every simulation, the software is launched fifty times and performs 120 runs before being 
stopped. The output data are saved in a list of fifty matrices.  
Each matrix is scanned to calculate the mean of every variable. The means are saved in another 
matrix (TabM) with fifty rows and a column for every variable considered. 
Simulations were carried out, using two models which differ only as regards the management of 
Social Security contributions. In one reality, (W2), the contributory rate for everyone is 35% of  
their gross income, while in the other, (W1), it varies depending on the number of children living in 
a family. 
Using this approach, some hypotheses have been tested, investigating what happens by changing 
the amount of expenditures due to a child, and the level of happiness related to a new birth.  
In particular, child expenditures have been tuned as follows: 
 
PERCENTAGE OF NET FAMILY INCOME SPENT FOR A 
CHILD: 
Model 1  10% 
Model 2  20% 
Model 3  30% 
Table 4.1 Different types of virtual reality 
 
Model 2 reflects  the typical Italian expenditure for a child (Perali 2005). 
After having fixed the average percentage of  income spent for a child at 20%, the level  of 
happiness due to a new birth has been modified. The aim was to investigate how the effects of a 
contributory relief vary, depending on the relational value associated with a child. 
In Model 4, families think that children are very important and precious; thus, their happiness 
greatly increases after a new birth. In particular, considering Fam1, the software operates on the 
mean of the normal distribution used to draw gamma in this way: 
-  if there are no children in a family, the mean is 0; 
-  in the year of a baby’s birth, 0,6 is added (subtracted for Fam2) to the mean; 
-  in the following year, the mean is decreased (increased for Fam2) by 0,05; 
-  two years after the birth, the mean is decreased (increased for Fam2) by 0,05; 
-  no further action on the mean is planned until another birth occurs. 
In contrast, in Model 5, children are not considered as crucial resources by families; thus, the 
mean of the normal distribution used to draw gamma for Fam1 is modified in this way: 
-  if there are no children in a family, both the mean and gamma are equal to 0; 
-  in the year of a baby’s birth, 0,2 is added (subtracted for Fam2) to the mean; 
-  in the following year, the mean is decreased (increased for Fam2) by 0,05; 
-  two years after the birth, the mean is decreased (increased for Fam2) by 0,05; 
-  no further action on the mean is planned until another birth occurs. 
 
Initially, a descriptive analysis of the outcomes of the simulations has been carried out. Then, 
linear regressions have been implemented to fully understand the existing correlations among key 
variables. 
4.1 Results: Descriptive Analysis 
The descriptive analysis  focuses on the observation of three variables of interest: income level, 
happiness and birth rate. The behaviour of such variables has been studied both by comparing the 
output data of the different models, and by developing some graphs for a more comprehensive 
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For each variable, a table gathering the means has been set up. The values collected in such 
tables have been calculated as the average values of the TabM data. 
Income  
Looking at the impact of the contributory relief on wealth, it is clear that passing from W2 to 
W1, Fam1’s income grows, while Fam2’s decreases. In all the models, (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5), the gap 
between salaries is almost the same. In particular, moving from W2 to W1, Fam1’s net income 
increases by 6%, while Fam2’s falls by 24%, which is roughly the same cost as the one due to a 
child (Perali 1999). This demonstrates that the policy adopted in W1 grants vertical equity, because 
those who do not want children are required to contribute to the intergenerational agreement with 
the  additional  money  that  they  would  have  saved,  being  free  from  children  expenditures.  In 
contrast, Fam1 are rewarded for their precious social contribution, represented by their children, 
and a reduced contributory rate has been applied to them. Indeed, every single child has a negative 
impact on their wage and so, for the same level of gross income, they have a lower contributory 
power.  
Thus,  in  W1,  both  the  value  of  the  resource  children  and  the  differences  among  agents’ 
contributory power have been recognised. 
 
INCOME 
VERSION WITH CONTRIBUTIVE RELIEF FOR FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN – W1 
Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5 
Fam1 Fam2 RM  Fam1 Fam2 RM  Fam1 Fam2 RM  Fam1 Fam2 RM  Fam1 Fam2 RM 
17.77 14.45 15.87 16.23 14.46 15.10 14.71 14.46 14.33 16.26 14.50 15.14 16.27 14.45 15.12 
VERSION  WITHOUT  CONTRIBUTIVE  REDUCTIONS  FOR  FAMILIES  WITH 
CHILDREN – W2 
Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5 
Fam1 Fam2 RM  Fam1 Fam2 RM  Fam1 Fam2 RM  Fam1 Fam2 RM  Fam1 Fam2 RM 
16.73 18.40 17.32 15.18 18.39 16.54 13.67 18.39 15.78 15.22 18.39 16.57 15.20 18.38 16.55 
Table  4.2  Average  income  level  of  families  with  children  (Fam1),  of  the  ones  without 
children (Fam2), and of the two together (RM),  in the different models (1, 2, 3, 4 e 5) 
 
Because of the lack of vertical equity in W2 as the average cost due to a child increases, the gap 
between the net salary of Fam1 and of Fam2 rises. As a matter of fact, in Model 1, it corresponds to 
1.67, in Model 2 it becomes 3.21, and then reaches the value of 4.92  in Model 3. 
Per contra, thanks to the contributory relief in W1, a better level of vertical equity is granted and 
the difference between Fam1 and Fam2’s wages diminishes as expenditures due to children grow. 
In fact, in Model 1, the gap value is 3.32 and, passing to Model 2, it becomes 1.87, and then reaches 
0.25  in Model 3. Hence, it could be said that by introducing an equity improvement, a more 
homogeneous wealth distribution may be achieved. 
Such trends are represented in the following graphs, which also prove that incomes are far more 
variable in W2 than in W1, and that the variability of Fam1’s wages grows as costs due to children 
increase. The salaries of families without children are in general more stable. 
The graphs show minimum, first quartile, median, third quartile and maximum of the considered 
distributions.  
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Figure 4.1 Distribution of income in Model 1 
 
   
Figure 4.2 Distribution of income in Model 2 
 
   
Figure 4.3 Distribution of income in Model 3                                                                         19 
 
Clearly, as the output data confirm, the average income does not change, if the happiness due to 
children grows (Model 4) or lessens (Model 5). 
Happiness  
HAPPINESS 
VERSION WITH CONTRIBUTIVE RELIEF FOR FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN – W1 
Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5 
Fam1  Fam2  Fam1  Fam2  Fam1  Fam2  Fam1  Fam2  Fam1  Fam2 
17.1287  16.5112  17.1282  16.5766  17.1409  16.6186  17.2







VERSION WITHOUT CONTRIBUTIVE REDUCTIONS FOR FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN – W2 
Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5 
Fam1  Fam2  Fam1  Fam2  Fam1  Fam2  Fam1  Fam2  Fam1  Fam2 








Table 4.3 Average happiness level of families with children (Fam1) and of the families 
without(Fam2) in the different models (1, 2, 3, 4 e 5) 
 
As far as the happiness trend is concerned, all the simulations prove that families with children 
tend to be happier than the ones without children. Furthermore, when contributory relief is granted, 
Fam1’s happiness increases further (i.e. in Model 3, it passes from 17,10 to 17,14), while Fam2’s  
decreases (i.e. in Model 3, it passes from 16,63 to 16,61) as shown in Figure 4.4. This implies that 
in W1, a higher level of average happiness has been reached, because Fam1 objects are far more 
than Fam2 ones. 
 
Figure 4.4 Happiness comparison between the world with contributory relief and the one 
without, in Model 2 
 
Another interesting trend  should be taken into account. In W2, the happiness of families with 
children diminishes as the expenditures due to children grow, while the SWB of families without                                                                         20 
children remains  stable. Instead, in W1,  both Fam1 and Fam2’s  happiness rises, passing from 
Model  1  to  Model  3.  This  phenomenon  can  be  explained  by  considering  simultaneously  the 
behaviour of happiness and income. 
As asserted by Kahneman and his co-authors (2006), the component of happiness related to 
income depends on agents’ age and on peers’ wage level. Clearly, in W1, as the expenditures due to 
children increase, the salaries of Fam1 decrease. The more substantial this decline is, the closer are 
the incomes of families without children to the ones of Fam1. Consequently, the objects Fam2,are 
more likely to reach the average income level of their peers, thereby increasing the value of the 
component of happiness related to their salary. 
As far as families with children are concerned, the benefit of the contributory relief will be more 
strongly perceived, if the expenditures due to children increase. Moreover, passing from Model 2 to 
Model 3, the decline of Fam1’s incomes does not have an impact on their happiness because it 
equally  affects  all  the  salaries  of  the  class  members.  Thus,  SWB  does  not  fall  because,  when 
comparing their income to that of their peers, agents only consider if they earn more or less than 
their colleagues. 
Hence, through contributory relief, vertical equity is improved, incomes are more homogeneous, 
and a higher level of collective happiness is reached. 
In Model 4 and in Model 5, instead, the SWB of Fam2 remains stable because these families do 
not care about children; hence, no changes will be noticed in their happiness trend if the calculus of 
gamma is modified. Per contra, Fam1’s happiness is far higher in Model 4 than in all the others, 
while it falls in Model 5. This phenomenon demonstrates that alterations of the happiness due to 
children  have  a  strong    impact  on  families  that  desire  them,  while  the  others  do  not  perceive 
anything in their SWB trends. 
It should be taken into account that changes in the happiness values are significant even though 
they are of the order of 10-1 or 10-2. Indeed, according to the setpoint model (Kahneman and 
Kreuger 2006), and to the results of Easterlin’s research (2006), SWB rises and falls but, in the long 
term, it always remains in the proximity of the initial level. 
 
Birth Rate 
Within  the  present  project,  we  aim  at  investigating  whether  an  equity  improvement  may 
positively  influence  the  worrying  demographic  trends  that  have  emerged  from  several  official 
reports (Commission of European Communities 2006, European Commission 2006). 
As suggested by De Santis and Breschi (2003), in order to test this hypothesis, after having 
applied the public policy chosen to boost fertility, the demographic trends have been measured and 
compared with the previous ones, analysing if and how the birth rate changes. 
The outcomes of the simulations demonstrate that, after the introduction of the fertility boosting 
policy, the birth rate rises in all the models, except Model 5. Indeed, thanks to the contributory 
relief, the financial pressures related to a new birth become lower, and families are more likely to 
have babies, if they desire them.  
The output data also show that the birth rate increase is higher in Models 2, 3 and 4. This 
phenomenon corresponds to what is expected, because the more the expenditures due to children 
increase, the more relevant is the negative impact of a new birth on income. Thus, since the costs 
due to children are very low in Model 1, families only slightly perceive the lack of equity and, 
moving from W2 to W1, the birth rate remains almost stable. Per contra, as children’s expenditure 
rises (Models 2, 3 and 4), the equity improvement is more strongly perceived and the birth-rate 
growth becomes appreciable. 
The outcomes of simulations summarized in Table 4.4 demonstrate that, in Model 5, the birth 
rate remains stable when passing from W2 to W1. This happens because the public policy applied 
does not aim at modifying the agents’ preferences. Its goal is only to remove some obstacles which                                                                         21 
may prevent families from having a baby. In Model 5, children are not considered important; thus, 
the birth rate remains at the same level even when the contributory relief is granted.  
 
BIRTH RATE 
VERSION WITH CONTRIBUTIVE RELIEF FOR FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN – 
W1 
Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5 
Birth Rate  Birth Rate  Birth Rate  Birth Rate  Birth Rate 
3.7302  3.9062  3.8021  3.8806  3.7242 
VERSION WITHOUT  CONTRIBUTIVE REDUCTIONS FOR  FAMILIES WITH 
CHILDREN – W2 
Model1  Model2  Model3  Model4  Model5 
Birth Rate  Birth Rate  Birth Rate  Birth Rate  Birth Rate 
3.7285  3.8214  3.7375  3.7861  3.7474 
 
Table 4.4 Summary of birth-rate average values. 
4.2 Linear Regression Analysis 
The  study  of  the  outcomes  of  simulations  continues  with  the  examination  of  the  existing 
relationships  among  the  variables  of  interest.  Linear  regression  models  with  one  or  more 




st Analysis: Quantitative regressor Average Wage – Dummy Contributory Relief 
This model investigates what effect the average wage has on happiness in W1 and in W2. In 
order to carry out  this inquiry,  a simple linear model  has been adopted,  with one independent 
variable and a dummy IA, whose value will be 1 if the field Contributory Relief is 1 (in W1), 0 if it 
is 0 (in W2). 
Thus, the function which describes the linear model is: 
[1] Happiness = β0 + β1AverageWage + IA (δ0 + δ 1 AverageWage) + ε 
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RESIDUALS 
MIN  1° QUARTILE  MEDIAN  3° QUARTILE  MAX 
-1.67060  -0.26944  -0.03181  0.26901  1.58016 
COEFFICIENTS 
  Estimated  Std. Error  T value  Pr(>|t|)   
Intercept  18.410146  0.080855  227.69  <2e-16  *** 
AverageWage  -0.093097  0.004885  -19.06  <2e-16  *** 
ContributoryRelief  -2.361364  0.127231  -18.56  <2e-16  *** 
AverageWage: 
ContributoryRelief 
0.146387  0.008133  18.00  <2e-16  *** 
PREDICTIVE POWER OF THE MODEL 
Multiple R-Squared  0.01824 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.01811 
F Statistic  p-value < 2.2e-16 
Table 4.5 Summary of the results of the first analysis 
 
As far as the model validation is concerned, the residuals behave in the proper way because the 
median is roughly 0 and minimum and maximum, first- and third- quartile values are symmetrical. 
Moreover,  R-Squared  value  (Multiple  R-Squared  and  Adjusted  R-Squared)  is  very  close  to  0; 
hence, the implemented model has not got a very good predictive power. 
Finally, F-Statistic has a p-value far smaller than 0.05; thus, the model has a solid structure. 
 
Considering what the linear regression may explain, it is clear that in W2 a unitary increment of 
the average wage causes a slight decrease of the level of happiness. Indeed, the function to calculate 
the happiness expected value is: 
[2] HappinessA = 18.410146 – 0,09 AverageWage 
and generates the fuchsia line in the following graph. 
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Figure 4.5 Impact of a unitary increment of the average wage on happiness in W2 (A 
fuchsia line) and in W1 (B blue line). 
 
Such  behaviour  reflects  the  hypothesis  made  concerning  the  role  played  by  income  in 
determining SWB. Indeed, happiness due to wealth is influenced by two components: age and 
relative income of one’s peers.  
In W2, there is a small number of families, without children, with a high income, and a large 
number of families, with children and a far lower salary. Within such domain, a unitary increment 
of the average wage does not imply a more equitable wealth distribution. Hence, the poorer agents 
do not have a greater chance of reaching the average salary, when comparing their income to it. 
Therefore, the happiness component related to relative wage will be negatively influenced by this 
wealth distribution and will have a trend with a slightly negative slope. 
With the introduction of the contributory relief, the situation changes. The function to evaluate 
the expected value of happiness becomes: 
[3] HappinessB = 16.048782 + 0.05329 AverageWage 
and generates the blue line in the previous graph. 
The contributory relief for families with children improves vertical equity and implies a more 
homogeneous wealth distribution in the system. Thus, a unitary increment of the average salary will 
imply a slight increase in happiness, because it is more likely that the vast majority of families 
(Fam1) will reach the average income level.  
In light of these considerations,  it  may  be asserted that the  contributory relief improves the 
component of happiness related to relative income and the happiness level itself. 
 
2
nd Analysis: Qualitative regressor Children – Dummy Contributory Relief 
This model investigates what effect children have on happiness in W1 and in W2. To carry out 
this inquiry a simple linear model has been adopted, with one independent qualitative variable and a 
dummy. 
The qualitative variable IF explains whether a family has children or not. It is equal to 1 for 
Fam1 and to 0 for Fam2. The value of the dummy IA will be 1 if the field Contributory Relief is 1 
(in W1), 0 if it is 0 (in W2).                                                                         24 
Thus, the function which describes the linear model is: 
[4] Happiness = β0 + β1 IF + IA (δ0 + δ 1 IF) + ε 
The results of the linear regression have been summarized in the following table: 
 
RESIDUALS 
MIN  1° QUARTILE  MEDIAN  3° 
QUARTILE 
MAX 
-1.379192  -0.129403  0.001032  0.129603  1.245597 
COEFFICIENTS 
  Estimate  Std. Error  T value  Pr(>|t|)   
Intercept  16.629192  0.002766  6011.29  <2e-16  *** 
Children  0.482027  0.003912  123.21  <2e-16  *** 
ContributoryRelief  -0.051864  0.003912  -13.26  <2e-16  *** 
Children: 
ContributoryRelief 
0.070048  0.005533  12.66  <2e-16  *** 
PREDICTIVE POWER OF THE MODEL 
Multiple R-Squared  0.5942 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.5941 
F Statistic  p-value < 2.2e-16 
Table 4.6 Summary of the results of the second analysis 
 
As far as the model validation is concerned, the residuals behave in the proper way because the 
median is roughly 0 and minimum and maximum, first- and third-quartile values are symmetrical. 
Moreover, R-Squared value (Multiple R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared) is quite close to 1 and, 
hence, the implemented model has a good predictive power. 
Finally, F-Statistic has a p-value far smaller than 0.05; thus, the model has a solid structure. 
 
Considering  what  the  model  allows  one  to  infer,  the  happiness  expected  values  have  been 
calculated: 
[5] HappinessA1 =  17.1          if I A = 0 thus in W2 and if I F = 1 thus for Fam1 
[6] HappinessA2 = 16.62         if I A = 0 thus in W2 and if I F = 0 thus for Fam2 
[7] HappinessB1 =  17.12        if I A = 1 thus in W1 and if I F = 1 thus for Fam1 
[8] HappinessB2 =  16.57        if I A = 1 thus in W1 and if I F = 0 thus for Fam2 
Clearly,  children  imply  a  considerable  increase  in  the  happiness  expected  value  and  the 
contributory  relief  further  strengthens  this  effect.  In  fact,  in  W1,  Fam2’s  happiness  tends  to 
diminish, while Fam1’s  increases.  
This occurs because the contributory relief improves vertical equity and recognizes the value of 
the resource “children” for society. Moreover, such policy reduces the negative impact that a new 
birth has on families’ wage, grants a more equitable wealth distribution and allows the ones having 
children to benefit from the happiness that a child gives, avoiding  exceedingly heavy negative 
financial consequences. Instead, Fam2 objects  have a higher contributive power and  contribute 
less to the intergenerational agreement because they do not have babies. In light of this evidence, a 
higher contributory rate has been applied to them, and their happiness, which in general is lower 
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These results and the effect of the contributory relief on the birth rate show that the equity 
improvement positively influences demographic trends, acting both on financial conditions and on 
SWB of Fam1. Indeed, when a new family is created, the couple decides to have children or not, 
taking into consideration not only their preferences, but also the happiness of people with children 
living in the society. This happens in the software implemented as well as in realty; hence, if the 
SWB of people having children rises, the number of families with children will tend to increase too.  
 
3
rd Analysis: Qualitative regressor child – Dummy Contributory Relief 
This model investigates the relevance of the impact of the average wage and of children on 
happiness, both in W1 and in W2.  
The qualitative variable IF explains whether a family has children or not. It is equal to 1 for 
Fam1 and to 0 for Fam2. The value of the dummy IA will be 1 if the field Contributory Relief is 1 
(in W1), and 0 if it is 0 (in W2). 
Hence, the function which describes the linear model is: 
[9] Happiness = β0 + β1 AverageWage +  β2 IF + IA (δ0 + δ1 AverageWage + δ 2 IF) + ε  
The results of the linear regression have been summarized in the following table: 
 
RESIDUALS 
MIN  1° QUARTILE  MEDIAN  3° 
QUARTILE 
MAX 
-2.131747  -0.138399  -0.003716  0.135543  1.941850 
COEFFICIENTS 
  Estimate  Std. Error  T value  Pr(>|t|)   
Intercept  17.739255  0.055702  318.46    <2e-16   *** 
AverageWage  -0.073597  0.003719   -19.79    <2e-16   *** 
Children  0.422855  0.004377  96.60  <2e-16   *** 
ContributoryRelief  -1.922204  0.088088  -21.82  <2e-16   *** 
AverageWage: 
ContributoryRelief 
0.128944  0.006149  20.97      <2e-16   *** 
ContributoryRelief :Children  0.075929   0.006190  12.27  <2e-16   *** 
PREDICTIVE POWER OF THE MODEL 
Multiple R-Squared  0.4408 
Adjusted R-Squared  0.4407 
F Statistic  p-value < 2.2e-16 
Table 4.7 Summary of the results of the third analysis 
 
As far as the model validation is concerned, the residuals behave properly because the median is 
roughly  0,  and  minimum  and  maximum,  first-  and  third-quartile  values  are  symmetrical. 
Furthermore, R-Squared value (Multiple R-Squared and Adjusted R-Squared) is close to 1 and, 
hence, the model has an appreciable predictive power. 
Finally, F-Statistic has a p-value far smaller than 0.05 and, so, the structure of the model is 
consistent.                                                                         26 
 
Considering  what  the  model  allows  one  to  infer,  the  happiness  expected  values  have  been 
calculated in the following way: 
[10] HappinessA1 =  17.73 - 0.073 AverageWage  if I A = 0 thus in W2 and if I F = 1 thus for 
Fam1 
[11] HappinessA2 = 18.15 - 0.073 AverageWage    if I A = 0 thus in W2 and if I F = 0 thus for 
Fam2 
[12] HappinessB1 =  15.81 + 0.05 AverageWage    if I A = 1 thus in W1 and if I F = 1 thus for 
Fam1 
[13] HappinessB2 = 16.30 + 0.05 AverageWage     if I A = 1 thus in W1 and if I F = 0 thus for 
Fam2 
Since β2 is far greater than β1 and since δ 2 is far greater than δ 1, certainly the impact which 
children have on happiness is much more relevant than that related to wage.  
As far as the trends are concerned, this model confirms what has been previously claimed.  
In W2, a unitary increment of wage causes a slight decrease of happiness, even though the 
happiness trend is shifted upwards (red line in Figure 4.6) in the presence of children. 
 
 
Figure 4.6 Impact that a unitary increment of average wage has on happiness in families 
with children (red line) and in those without (blue line) within W2 world. 
 
In W1, instead, happiness slightly rises after a unitary increment of salary and, similarly to what 
happens in W2, the happiness trend is shifted upward if there are children in a family.  
Furthermore, the linear regression model shows that children have a more positive impact on 
happiness in W1 than in W2 and, indeed, the upward shift is 0.42 (β2) in W2 and 0.49 (β2 + δ 2) in 
W1. This is the consequence of the vertical-equity improvement and of the recognition of the added 
value connected to a new birth. 
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Figure 4.7 Impact that a unitary increment of average wage has on happiness 
in families with children (red line) and in those without (blue line) within W1 
world. 
5.  Conclusions and future developments 
Within the theoretical frame here assumed from the outcomes of simulations, one could state that 
an  increase  in  the  vertical-equity  improvement  has  a  positive  impact  on  demographic  trends, 
increases the happiness level and grants a more equitable wealth distribution. This influence on 
demography is to be considered as a consequence of two trends: the income trend and the happiness 
one.  
The introduction of the contributory relief, in fact, implies a growth of Fam1’s average salary, 
which in W2 is burdened by children expenditures, and is generally below the average wage level. 
Instead, Fam2’s contributory rate rises because Fam2 objects are free from children expenditures 
and,  therefore,  they  have  a  higher  contributory  power.  The  consequence  of  this  policy  is  the 
downturn of their net income.  
Hence, in W1, families without children have a lower net income and the gap between Fam1 and 
Fam2 wages is far smaller than in W2. Agents tend to have salaries which are very close to the 
average one and the happiness component, related to relative income, benefits from this effect 
because these agents are more likely to earn at least as much as their peers. 
Analysing the simulation results, it is clear that the happiness of families with children rises, 
passing from W2 to W1, while the SWB of families without children diminishes. Given that Fam1 
objects are far more than Fam2 ones, this trend implies that average SWB tends to be higher in W1 
than in W2. This is considered as one of the most important causes of the positive effects perceived 
on demography. Indeed, when a new family has to decide whether to have children or not, it will be 
influenced both by its preferences and by what happens in society. Thus, the happier the ones 
having children are, the more likely is it that the new family decides to have a child. This implies 
that the birth rate benefits from the increase of Fam1’s SWB.  
Moreover, linear regression analysis shows that children play a far more important role than the 
one played by income in determining people’s happiness level. The values of linear regression 
parameters also demonstrate that contributory relief further increases the happiness which a new 
birth may imply. In the third analysis, indeed, β2 + δ 2 is greater than β2.  
Considering  the  increasing  importance  of  the  second  and  of  the  third  pillars  of  retirement 
systems, it may be of great interest to complete the developed model, including also these elements. 
In particular, a wide range of private retirement saving programmes could be implemented in the 
virtual reality in order to try to investigate what kind of policies and financial instruments could be                                                                         28 
more effective. Within this domain, a more comprehensive equity improvement may be conceived 
and the analysis of the outcomes could be useful to confirm or refute what has been discovered 
during this research. 
Further, in the literature, several authors have pointed out various behavioural anomalies related 
to  private  retirement  saving  decisions,  like  hyperbolic  discounting  (Frederick,  Loewenstein, 
O’Donoghue 2002), bounded self interest (Mullainathan and Thaler 2000), bounded self control 
(Mullainathan and Thaler 2000) and so on. Through the evolution of the software implemented so 
far, it may be possible to investigate the effectiveness of human- learning processes, of educational 
programmes, of information campaigns and of different kinds of financial services in solving these 
behavioural  anomalies, analysing  also  their  impact  on  SWB,  on  financial  conditions  of  people 
during the whole life cycle and on demography.                                                                         29 
Appendix 
A.1 Observer Swarm Interface 
 
 
 Figure A1.1  Screenshot of Model Swarm panel used to set the initial values of 
variables 
 
Figure A1.2  Screenshot of the panel used to set the frequency of the visualization of 
the output trends. 
 
Figure A1.3  Screenshot of the control panel 
 
Figure A1.4  Average income trend 
                                                                         30 
Figure A1.5  Average happiness trend 
 
Figure A1.6  Numerousess of agents trend 
 
Figure A1.7  Bar chart concerning the numerousness of agents 
 
Figure A1.8  Bar chart concerning families’ happiness 
 
Figure A1.9 Bar chart concerning the average level of taxes and average level of social 
security contributions. 
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